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Recent Developments
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEXBASED MORTALITY TABLES

I

n Arizona Governing Committee for
Tax Deferred Annuity and Compensation Plans 4.1. Nathalie Norris
_U.S.-. 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d.
1236 (1983), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that an employer
may not offer its employees' life annuity
plans from private insurance companies
that use sex-based actuarial mortality
tables. To allow employers to do so, the
Court found, would in effect permit the
practice of discrimination on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.c. §§ 2000 et seq., which makes it
unlawful employment practice "to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1) (1964).

I.
Since 1974, Arizona's Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity
and Deferred Compensation plans has
administered a deferred compensation
plan whereby it has selected several
insurance companies to participate in
the "Plan" and, in turn, has offered its
employees to enroll in the plan. When
an employee chooses to participate in
Arizona's plan, he must designate one of
the participating companies chosen by
Arizona in which he wishes to invest his
deferred wages. Once the employee so
designates and decides the amount of
compensation to be deferred each
month, Arizona is responsible for
withholding the appropriate sums from
the employee's wages and directing
those sums to the appropriate company.
Insurance companies generally base
the amount of monthly retirement
benefits due a retired employee on: 1)
the amount of compensation the employee defers; 2) the employee's age
at retirement; and 3) the employee's sex.
All the companies chosen by Arizona to
participate in the plan employ sex-based
mortality tables to calculate benefit
amounts. The tables award a man larger
monthly payments than a woman who
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deferred the same amount of compensation and retired at the same age.
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie
Norris, an employee of the Arizona
Department of Economic Security,
elected to participate in Arizona's plan,
and invested her deferred compensation
in Lincoln National Insurance Company's fixed annuity contract. Norris,
103 S.Ct. at 3495.
On April 25, 1978, Norris brought
suit against the state, the governing
committee and several of its members,
alleging that the plan discriminates on
the basis of sex.
II.
The Court's opinion first probed the
question of whether the defendants
would have violated Title VII had they
conducted the entire plan themselves,
without the participation of any insurance companies. The Court found
direction in its opinion in Los Angeles

Department of Water and Power 4.1.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which
was apparently the first challenge to
contribution differences based on valid
actuarial tables since the enactment of
Title VII in 1974. In Manhart, the Court
held that an employer had violated the
statute by requiring its female employees
to make larger contributions to a
pension fund than male employees in
order to obtain the same monthly
benefits upon retirement. The Court
found that the pension fund treated each
woman "in a manner but for (her) sex
would (have been) different." 435 U.S.
at 710, quoting Developments in the Law,
Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of I964, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971).
Applying the "but for" standard
illustrated in Manhart, the Court in
Norris wholly rejected the defendants'
contention that the Arizona plan does
not discriminate on the basis of sex
because a man and a woman who defer
the same amount of compensation will
obtain upon retirement policies having
approximately the same present actuarial
value. The Court found no difficulty in
holding that the "classification of
employees on the basis of sex is no more
permissible at the pay-out stage of a
retirement plan than at the pay-in
stage." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497. It

further noted that the defendants'
assumption that sex may be properly
used to predict longevity is inconsistent
with the lesson of Manhart: that Title
VII requires employers to treat their
employees as individuals, not " 'as
simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual, or national class.'" Norris, 103
S.Ct. at 3498, quoting Manhart, 435
U.S. at 708 (emphasis by Court).
Thus, the majority opinion established
that "it is just as much discrimination
'because of... sex' to pay a woman lower
benefits when she has made the same
contributions as a man as it is to make
her pay larger contributions to obtain
the same benefits." Id. at 3499.
continued on page 14

COMPUTER SOFTWARE
COPYRIGHTABILITY

I

n Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin

Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the denial of Apple's motion
for preliminary injunction seeking to
restrain Franklin from infringing copyrights on 14 of its software programs.
The unanimous three-judge panel ruled
that copyright protection does extend to
operating programs.
Franklin manufactures and sells the
Ace 100 personal computer designed to
be "Apple compatible" so that peripheral equipment and software designed
for the Apple II could be used in
conjunction with the Ace 100. In order
to achieve this compatibility, Franklin
admittedly copied 14 of Apple's operating system programs (the instructions
which tell the computer which functions
to perform). Operating programs can be
stored on a variety of memory devices
such as semi-conductor "micro-chips,"
which are connected to the circuitry,
and "floppy disks" (flexible magnetic
disks similar to phonograph records).
These programs are referred to as
software, whereas the machinery of the
computer is known as hardware.
Franklin explained that designing its
own programs would be impractical and
would not ensure 100% compatibility
because "there were just too many entry

points in relationship to the number of
instructions in the program." Apple,
714 F.2d at 1245. Franklin defended,
however, that the operating programs
were not copyrightable; first, because
they are embedded on a micro~chip and
are therefore a form of machinery and
second, because they cannot be distin~
guished from the concept of operating
the computer system, they are more
than the mere expression of an idea.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 102
(1976).
Both of Franklin's arguments were
rejected by the court which reasoned
that the programs do not meet the
requirements of the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. The
programs are "literary works," and they
are "fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression." Id. at § 102(a). The court
went on to hold that "the medium is not
the message" and the fact that a program
is recorded on a device which is part of
the machinery is a mere change in the
tangible form. Apple, 714 F .2d at 1251.
In response to Franklin's second argu~
ment that an operating system is a mere
method of operation and not protected,
the court relied on Congress's Commis~
sion on New Technological Uses report
which stated "[t]hat the words of a
program are used ultimately in the
implementation of a process should in
no way affect their copyrightability." id.
The court also found that Apple was
seeking only to copyright the instructions
and not the computer operating method.
With the growing number of personal
computers in businesses and private
homes throughout the United States,
this decision protects not only large
computer companies such as Apple, but
also the individual computer operator
who creates hislher own operating
program. ~
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LACK OF JURY
IMPARTIALITY REQUIRED
FOR NEW TRIAL

I

n McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.
v. Greenwood, _ U.S. _ (1984),

the United States Supreme Court
clarified the bases upon which a motion
for new trial made as a result of a juror's
failure to disclose information on voir
dire will be granted. To prevail upon
such a motion, a party must show that a
juror's answer to a material question on
voir dire was dishonest and that had the
juror answered honestly, grounds estab~
lishing a challenge for cause would have
been present.
In McDonough Power, Billy Greenwood
and his parents brought suit against
McDonough Power Equipment Incor~
porated to recover damages for injuries
sustained by Billy when his feet came in
contact with the blades of a riding lawn
mower manufactured by McDonough,
Inc. During voir dire, prospective jurors
were asked if they or any of their family
members had ever sustained a severe
injury. One individual, who eventually
became a member of the jury, failed to
respond to this question. After the trial,
the United States District Court entered
judgment upon a jury verdict for
McDonough, Inc.
After entry of the judgment, the
Greenwoods requested and received
permission to approach the jurors in an
attempt to elicit information regarding
injuries sustained by them or members
of their families. Despite discovery of
evidence that a juror had not disclosed
information regarding such injuries, the
district court denied the Greenwood's
motion for a new trial, stating that the
jury verdict was fair and well~supported.
The Greenwoods appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
which reversed the district court judg~
ment. In Greenwood v. McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc., 687 F.2d338 (10th Cir.
1982), the court of appeals held that the
Greenwood's right of per~emptory
challenge had been prejudiced because
of the juror's failure to respond to a
question on voir dire. To cure the error
of the juror's "probable bias," a new
trial was granted. The Supreme Court
however, reversed, holding that a new
trial will not be granted unless a juror's
nondisclosure results in a partial jury.
The court's opinion begins by tracing
the legislative and judicial history of the
harmless error rules. These rules were
adopted to curb the abuses of appellate

review procedures because at one time
"courts of review tower[ ed] above the
trials... as impregnable citadels of
technicality" with trials representing
attempts to get reversible error on the
record. Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 759 (1946). The effect of the
harmless error rules is that courts, in
their judgment, can disregard errors in
the proceeding which do not interfere
with the fairness of the trial.
continued on page 24

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME

F

or the first time in Maryland, a
trial court has held that expert
testimony on the victim's emo~
tional trauma is admissible in a rape
case to show the victim did not consent
to intercourse. State v. Allewalt, docket
No. 83~CR~2517 (Circuit Court for
Baltimore County November 4, 1983).
Relying on consent as his defense,
Allewalt was convicted of rape after a
psychiatrist described the symptoms
the complainant suffered, and testified
that they were attributable to the
emotional condition known as rape
trauma syndrome.
Rape trauma syndrome is a specific
type of stress disorder which arises
from the emotional impact of being
raped. The symptoms most commonly
associated with rape trauma syndrome
include fear of men in general, fear of
being alone, fear of being raped again,
disturbance in sleep habits, loss of
appetite, depression, and a sense of
shame.
Without the support of expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome,
the defense of consent was often
difficult to disprove because of lack of
physical evidence. Many times the
decision in such a case would be based
solely on the testimony of the com~
plainant and defendant; therefore, the
credibility of each testimony was
critical in the determination of the
outcome. By allowing the expert to
testify, the complainant's testimony
that she did not consent to intercourse
can be corroborated by the testimony
of a psychiatrist. Rape trauma testimony,
therefore, could significantly strengthen
the prosecution's case.
Only a handful of states have directly
decided the issue of admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome. Minnesota, the only
state with more than one decision on
point, has held that the admission of
expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome is reversible error. State v.
Fall, 1984/The Law Forum-ll

